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Genetic Diagnosis and Intellectual Property Rights:
A Proposal To Amend "The Physician Immunity Statute"
Gregory P. Lekovic, M.D., J.D., Ph.D.*
It is difficult to overstate the extent of the revolution in medicine that
is currently underway.' Across therapeutic areas, critical links between
genes and disease are emerging and proving to be further-reaching than
• • 2
anticipated. Researchers have realized that genetics can play a
contributory role in the pathology of diseases long believed to be non-
genetic, such as infectious disease.' Improved understandings of the
genetic bases of disease have raised prospects of novel therapies that have
the potential to prevent or cure previously untreatable conditions.4
Arguably, this increased understanding of genetics has had its greatest
impact in diagnostics where "molecular diagnostic tests ... can provide...
presymptomatic testing for late-onset disorders" and "can be used for
population based screening to predict future genetic disease or assess the
risk for complex conditions such as cancer, cardiovascular diseases, and
* Resident, Division of Neurological Surgery, Barrow Neurological Institute, St.
Joseph's Hospital, Phoenix, Arizona. M.D, College of Medicine, University of Illinois at
Chicago; Ph.D., Department of Anatomy and Cell Biology, University of Illinois at Chicago;
J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. This work was supported
by a Student Fellowship from the Chicago-Kent College of Law Institute of Science, Law,
and Technology.
1. For a general genetics reference text, see EMERYAND RIMOIN'S PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF MEDICAL GENETICS (David L. Rimoin et al. eds., 4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE].
2. One area in which "[m]olecular genetic testing is increasingly available [is]
pediatric practice." Comm. on Genetics, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Molecular Genetic Testing in
Pediatric Practice: A Subject Review, 106 PEDIATRICS 1494, 1497 (2000) [hereinafter Am. Acad.
of Pediatrics].
3. For example, the role of genetics in the progression of HIV to AIDS is a topic of
current research. For an overview of the role of genetics in infectious disease, see Shelley
Segal and Adrian V.S. Hill, Genetic Susceptibility to Infectious Disease, 11 Trends
Microbiology 445 (2003).
4. For a review in the context of conditions affecting the Central Nervous System, see
R. Tinsley & P. Eriksson, Use of Gene Therapy in Central Nervous System Repair, 109 ACTA
NEUROLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 1 (2004).
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neurodegenerative disorders in otherwise healthy people., 5 Genetic
diseases and syndromes such as Alpert's Disease, Crouzon's disease, Von
Recklinghausen's disease, hemophilia A, myotonic dystrophy, muscular
dystrophy, hemochromatosis, and Canavan Disease can now all be
diagnosed, even prenatally, with a high degree of accuracy, using
molecular probes or polymerase chain reaction (PCR) technology.6 Pre-
implantation diagnosis of embryos may in the future allow for the
eradication of such diseases altogether Although each of these diseases is
very rare, in the aggregate they constitute a significant disease burden in
the pediatric population; over five percent of all live born children will
develop disease with a significant genetic contribution before the age
twenty-five.8 Moreover, many of these diseases individually have a markedly
increased incidence in select populations, such as Jews of Ashkenazi
origin. 9 For families afflicted with these rare conditions, the availability of
5. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, supra note 2, at 1494, 1494.
6. In each of these cases, the gene responsible for the disease has been identified, and
a test has been developed and brought to market that directly examines the patient's DNA
to determine if the suspected mutation is present. It is estimated that ten to twelve new
molecular diagnostic tests become available each year. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, supra note 2,
at 1494. However, there are limits to the utility of genetic testing. Not all genetic diseases
are best diagnosed by molecular tests: Cystic fibrosis, the most common genetic disease
among Caucasians (one in twenty-five is a carrier), is not suited to molecular diagnosis
because the number of mutations causing the disease is too high, making genetic screening
currently impractical. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, supra note 2, at 1495. For a complete list of
genetic tests available, as well as a directory of laboratories offering testing, see
http://www.genetests.org.
PCR stands for polymerase chain reaction and is the chemical reaction by which
minute samples of DNA can be amplified into enough genetic material to be readily
analyzed. Paul Rabinow, What Is PCR?, Univeristy of California, Berkeley, at
http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/pcr/index.html (last visited May 1, 2004).
7. Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis is a technique that relies on genetic testing of
embryos obtained through in vitro fertilization prior to 'implanting' the embryos back into
the mother's uterus. Thus, the likelihood that a child will be born with the disease can be
greatly reduced by implanting only embryos that are free from disease. For an overview of
the current status of the development of this technique, see Anuja Dokras, Pre-Implantation
Genetic Diagnosis, at http://www.hygeia.org/poems5.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
8. D.L. Rimoin et al., Nature and Frequency of Genetic Disease, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE,
supra note 1, at 55, 56.
9. Genetic diseases often have higher incidence in genetically isolated populations.
For example, Ashkenazi Jews (Jews of Eastern European descent) are more likely to suffer
from Tay-Sachs, Canavan's disease, and several other disorders. Individuals of Ashkenazi
Jewish heritage are advised to be screened for these diseases prior to having children. See
IV:2 (2004)
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genetic tests that can be used to determine whether adults are carriers of
disease"° or to diagnose an unborn child may influence family planning
decisions and therefore be of the utmost importance.
The cost of this rapid progress has been borne by both the public, via
the National Institutes of Health, and by private enterprises, which have
invested research dollars into developing quick, simple, and accurate
means to diagnose genetic diseases. As an incentive (and reward) for
efforts to discover the genes responsible for disease, the United States
offers protected intellectual property rights. However, while the goal of the
patent system is indisputably to promote the generation and dissemination
of new knowledge and techniques, patents can paradoxically lead to a
decrease in the availability of genetic-based tests." In Part I of this Article,
I trace the major contours of the development of gene patenting in the
United States and discuss the Physician Immunity Statute, 2 a statute
designed to ensure that the patenting of medical procedures does not
impair the treatment of patients. As I argue below, the protections of the
statute, in its current form, do not go far enough. In Part II, I illustrate the
problems raised by the limitations of the Physician, Immunity Statute by
examining Canavan disease, the patent on the gene that encodes for it,
and enforcement of that patent. Canavan disease is an incurable metabolic
disorder, the gene for which was discovered in 1993 by Dr. Reuben
Matalon.' 3 The gene was patented by Miami Children's Hospital, which
National Tay-Sachs & Allied Disease Association, Inc., at
http://www.ntsad.org/ntsad/intromap.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2004).
10. For diseases caused by recessive genes, both copies of an individual's gene must
have the error that causes the disease. Individuals who have one gene with the error and
one "normal" gene are called carriers. They do not themselves generally have the disease,
but they can pass it onto their children. J. Cook, Mendelian Inheritance, in PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 104, 109. It is important to distinguish carriers of genetic
diseases from carriers of infectious disease, who may transmit the disease simply through
close contact with individuals.
11. A body of legal scholarship recognizes and explores the possibility that patent
regimes might hinder innovation and limiting access to inventions. See, e.g., Michael Heller
& Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1996); Clarisa Long,
Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49 EMORY L.J. 823 (2000); Arti K. Rai, The
Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access
in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 173.
12. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000).
13. What Is Canavan Disease?, Canavan Foundation, at
http://www.canavanfoundation.org/canavan.php (last visited Apr. 25, 2004); see also Mary
Kugler, Gene Patent: For Mankind's Good, or For Profit?, About.com, at
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subsequently enforced the patent, leading to a lawsuit filed by the families
of Canavan-afflicted children. 4 Canavan disease provides a particularly
compelling example of the potential problems with gene patents for
several reasons. The gene's discovery involved research initiated by-and
initially funded by-the afflicted families. 5 Therefore, the Canavan story
reflects an exception to the usual patent paradigm where a pharmaceutical
company speculates on a technology by expending significant financial
resources on research and development. In addition, since there is no
treatment, let alone cure, for Canavan's disease, genetic testing of the
parents and/or prenatal screening represent the only options for parents
who do not want to have a child with this devastating condition; these
techniques allow parents either to avoid pregnancy or to terminate
affected embryos.
A solution fashioned by the legislature that could ensure patients'
access to genetic testing information while recognizing the biotechnology
companies' financial interests in using gene patents to develop treatments
and cures for genetic diseases would represent a crucial step forward in the
genetic revolution. In Part III of the Article, I offer a proposal to amend
the Physician Immunity Statute that would allow patients unfettered access
to diagnostic testing for any known gene sequence, whether patented or
not. Specifically, I argue that the provisions of the Physician Immunity
Statute that prevent enforcement of patent infringement actions against
physicians performing patented procedures or methods of diagnosis be
applied to genetic diagnoses as well.
I. THE PATENT PROCESS
Congress is authorized by Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution to issue patents "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts."" The patent system has been described as a kind of bargain
between the inventor and society, in which monopoly rights are granted to
the inventor for a limited time in exchange for the disclosure of the
invention. 7 By disclosing the invention to the public, the inventor
contributes knowledge to the arts and sciences and thereby spurs further
http://rarediseases.about.com/Iibrary/weekly/aa11201a.htm (last visited May 1, 2004).
14. See infra Section II.B.
15. See id.
16. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. See MARGARETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 18 (2d ed. 2001). The current
patent term is twenty years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
IV:2 (2004)
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innovation, including efforts to design around the patent. In order to allow
competitors to engage in such innovation, however, the patent must give
notice as to the scope of the invention through the use of specific and
particular claims.
Current statutory requirements regarding patents were passed into law
in the Patent Act of 1952. ' Five statutory requirements for patentability are
that the invention be of patentable subject matter,'" that the invention be
"non-obvious, '0 that it have utility,2' that it be adequately disclosed,22 and
that it be precisely claimed.23 In exchange for disclosure, the patent holder
gains the right to exclude others from making, selling, offering for sale,
using, or importing the patented object in the United States.24 In order to




In 1980, the Supreme Court opened the door to gene patenting by
clarifying that biological materials could fall within the purview of ordinary
patent protection." Since then however, the practice of gene patenting has
generated much controversy.27 Scholars have challenged the practice of
18. Act ofJuly 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified at 35 U.S.C.).
19. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
20. Id. § 103.
21. Id. § 101.
22. Id. § 112.
23. Id.
24. Id. §§ 101-112, 271 (2000).
25. Infringement occurs when a patented invention is made, used, imported, offered
for sale, or sold by someone other than the patent holder (or licensee). Infringement can
be either literal, where the infringing product is exactly the same as the patented product,
or by equivalence, where the differences between the patented invention and the infringing
product are too minor to constitute successful "design around" the patent. See id. § 271
(2000).
26. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (granting a patent for a genetically
modified oil-dissolving microbe). The Court asserted in Diamond that "Congress intended
statutory subject matter to include 'anything under the sun that is made by man."' Id. at 309
(quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82=1923, at 6 (1952)). The Court
noted that the same language was used by P.J. Federico, "a principal draftsman of the 1952"
legislation, in his testimony about the legislation before the House. Id. at 309 n.6. In
Diamond, the bacteria in question had been modified and thus constituted a creation. Id.
27. See generally Barbara Looney, Should Genes be Patented? The Gene Patenting Controversy:
5
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issuing patents on genes on policy grounds, and they have employed
various moral, 8 medical, 29 ethical,30 and scientific" arguments in opposition
to the practice of issuing gene patents and to the withholding of data that
might lead to those patents. Many argue against gene patents out of the
fear that over-reaching DNA patents will enable patent holders to encroach
on what is considered the "heritage of humanity,"32 with consequent
deleterious effects on patient care and privacy.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has responded
to such concerns by assuring the public that "the concern that a person
whose body 'includes' a patented gene could infringe the patent is
misfounded. The body does not contain the patented, isolated and
purified gene because genes in the body are not in the patented, isolated
and purified form.22 Currently, the PTO sees little difference between
DNA molecules and other chemical compounds.M In 2001, the PTO issued
"a revised version of guidelines to be used by Office personnel in their
review of patent applications for compliance with the 'utility' requirement
of 35 U .S.C . 10 .
'35
Arguably, the patentability of Expressed Sequence Tags (ESTs), DNA
fragments that can be used as "molecular probes," was "the most
controversial issue addressed by the new guidelines."36 The 2001 guidelines
make clear that ESTs are not categorically ineligible for patent protection,
Legal, Ethical, and Policy Foundations of an International Agreement, 26 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 231
(1994).
28. For a brief survey of religious groups' position statements on gene patenting, see
Ronald Cole-Turner, Religion and Gene Patenting, 270 SCIENCE 52 (1995).
29. Eliot Marshall, Is Data Hoarding Slowing Assault on Pathogens?, 275 SCIENCE 777, 777
(1997).
30. Id.; see also Rebecca Eisenberg, Intellectual Property at the Public-Private Divide: The Case
of Large Scale cDNA Sequencing, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 557 (1996).
31. Out of over 2000 faculty researchers surveyed, a statistically significant higher
proportion of genetic researchers (nearly one in six) refused to share research results with
colleagues. David Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life Science, 277
JAMA 1224, 1224, 1227 (1997); see also Erin G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic
Genetics: Evidence from a National Survey, 287JAMA 473 (2002).
32. Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, U.N. Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 29th Sess., 29 C/Resolution 19 (1997).
33. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001).
34. Id. at 1094.
35. Id. at 1092.
36. The Fate of Gene Patents Under the New Utility Guidelines, 2001 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 8
[hereinafter Fate of Gene Patents].
IV:2 (2004)
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but also affirm that "[1] ike any descriptive property, a DNA sequence itself
is not patentable. A purified DNA molecule isolated from its natural
environment, on the other hand, is a chemical compound and is
patentable if all of the statutory requirements are met. "37 In particular, the
guidelines sought to operationalize the judiciary's conception of the utility
requirement by "requir[ing] the disclosure of at least one specific,
substantial, and credible utility."38 Although it was not entirely clear how
these criteria would apply to "a given EST," the disclosure of a number of
factors, such as "the sequence of the corresponding complete mRNA
sequence, protein coding sequence or genomic sequence," "the function
of the protein encoded by the corresponding mRNA," and "the phenotype
of a mutation in the corresponding gene," could all conceivably solidify a
claim for patent protection of an EST.39
Since patents are by definition exclusive, there is no positive burden
on the patentee to use the invention; a patent simply grants the right to
exclude others, including the right to restrict the licensing of the invention
for non-economic reasons. Applied to diagnostics, the issuance of a patent
practically creates a right to exclude patients from being diagnosed. Of
particular importance in relation to diagnostic tests based on gene patents
is the right of the patent holder to decrease access to prenatal screening,
whether as a consequence of the patentee's pecuniary interest or to further
a non-economic objective.
Concerns that the patenting of genes would limit the availability of
diagnostic testing are a relatively recent phenomenon. In fact, the first 150
years of patent jurisprudence in this country did not recognize the
patentability of medical procedures, treatments, or methods of diagnosis.
40
However, by the 1950s, the prohibition against the patenting of medical
procedures began to erode, 4 and by the early 1990s, the medical
community began to become concerned about the potential impact such
patents could have on the delivery of health care and research. While the
37. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1094 cmt. 8.
38. Id. cmt. 9.
39. Fate of Gene Patents, supra note 36.
40. Robert M. Portman, Legislative Restriction on Medical and Surgical Procedure Patents
Removes Impediment to Medical Progress, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 91, 92 (1996).
41. ExparteScherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. 107 (BNA) (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954) (holding that
claims for a medical treatment could be patented). The opposite trend was developing in
the rest of the world. As of 1996, over eighty countries, as well as the European Union,
exempt medical procedures from patent protection. Thus the Physician Immunity Statute
can be seen as harmonizing U.S. law with that of other nations. Portman, supra note 40, at
92.
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medical community secured some protection from Congress, the
protections were not as great as they could have been or, as I will argue
below, as great as they should have been. I turn to the history of these
protections-and their limitations-in the next Section.
B. The Physician Immunity Statute
The rallying cry about the need for protections from patent
infringement suits for the medical community came when Dr. Samuel
Pallin sued Dr. Jack Singer for infringement of Pallin's patented procedure
for use in cataract surgery.42 Pallin v. Singer was the first case in which a
physician sued another physician for infringement of a medical procedure
patent; as a result, the medical community became concerned about the
deleterious consequences such litigation would present should such
patents become widespread.
Largely as a consequence of the Pallin litigation, the AMA adopted an
ethical resolution in 1994 "vigorously condemning" the patenting of
medical procedures and pledging to "work with Congress to outlaw" such
patents.4 3 Soon after the AMA took this position, a coalition of medical and
interest groups, the "Medical Procedure Patent Coalition," was formed
with the goal of persuading Congress to pass a legislative solution to the
problem of procedure patents." Not surprisingly, the Coalition met with
fierce resistance from the biotechnology and pharmaceutical lobbies. The
biotechnology lobby, in particular, felt threatened by what it considered a
"foolhardy" attempt to address the perceived problem through legislation,
fearing that the legislation as initially proposed would adversely affect the
industry's ability to bring new therapeutic methods, such as Cephalon's
innovative use of the drug IGF-1, to market.45 Claiming that the legislation
would "sever the critical lifeline" between the industry and the medical
community,46 industry representatives were able to convince the Coalition
to accept compromise legislation that specifically exempted
42. Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1050 (BNA) (D. Vt. 1995). Dr. Pallin's lawsuit was
ultimately unsuccessful.
43. 1994 ANNuAL MEETING, AMA, Substitute Resolution 2.
44. See Portman, supra note 40.
45. The Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act: Hearings on H.R 1127 Before the
House Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop., 104th Cong. 98 (1995) (prepared
statement of Frank Baldino, Jr., President and CEO of Cephalon, Inc.). Baldino testified
"on behalf of Cephalon and the Biotechnology Industry Organization." Id. at 94.
46. Id. at 93.
IV:2 (2004)
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"biotechnology" patents from the legislation, 47 and the result48 was adopted
into law. " Thus, while the Physician Immunity Statute exempts "medical
practitioner[s]" from liability for patent infringement for performing a
qualified "medical activity," the Statute specifies that a "medical activity"
does not include the "practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology
patent.
50
The legislative history of the Physician Immunity Statute shows that the
provisions which exclude the "patented use of a composition of matter in
violation of such patent"5' and "the practice of a process in violation of a
biotechnology patent, 52 respectively, are intended to protect "use
patents. 5 3 For purposes of this provision, the definition of a 'biotechnology
patent' includes a patent on a 'biotechnology process' as defined in35
U.S.C. §103(b), as well as a patent on a process of making or using
biological materials. Thus, biotechnology patents are wholly exempt from
the application of the Physician Immunity Statute. This result reflects the
success of the biotechnology lobby's aggressive efforts. 4
According to widely-held principles of bioethics, physicians should
47. For general review of the legislative proposals leading up to H.R. 3610, see Eric M.
Lee, 35 U.S.C. § 287 (c)-The Physician Immunity Statute, 79J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC.
701 (1997). For contrary accounts of the passage of the Physician Immunity Statute and its
merits, see Richard P. Burgoon,Jr., Silk Purses, Sows Ears and Other Nuances Regarding35
U.S.C. § 287(c), 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PRoP.J. 69 (1996); and Portman, supra note 40. Burgoon
was chair of the Intellectual Property Committee for the Biotechnology Industry
Organization, and Portman represented the Medical Procedure Patent Coalition in its
effort to get § 287(c) passed.
48. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 616, 110
Stat. 3009, 3009-67 (1996) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000)).
49. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000).
50. 35 U.S.C. §§ 287(c) (1)-(c) (2) (A) (2000).
51. Id. § 287(c) (2) (A) (ii). This provision is limited by the later § 287(c) (2) (F) to
situations in which the use of the composition of matter is directly related to the objective
of the procedure.
52. Id. § 287(c) (2) (A) (iii). This provision, unlike § 287 (c) (2) (ii), is not constrained by
other subsections.
53. A use or utility patent is a patent obtained on an invented composition of matter (as
opposed to a design patent, which is a patent on an ornamental design or appearance, or a
plant patent, which is a patent on a novel plant). See BARRETT, supra note 17, at 111-371.
54. However, even the biotechnology industry is not without internal dissent. In
testimony before the Federal Trade Commission and Department ofJustice, Barbara
Caulfield, general counsel for the biotechnology company Affymetrix stated that "there
should be no patenting of gene sequences, period." See Tom Abate, Do Gene Patents Wrap
Research in Red Tape?, S.F. CHRON., March 25, 2002, at El.
9
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respect patients' abilities to make their own decisions about their
healthcare; they also have a responsibility to avoid causing harm to patients
or failing to prevent harm.5 Under the principle of autonomy, a patient
has the right to be free of interferences in making decisions regarding
their own bodies and medical decisions. 6 Any interference in the ability to
make such decisions compromises a patient's autonomy. Although there is
no general right to diagnosis-there is no a priori absolute right to be
diagnosed with a condition any more than an absolute right to health
care-no one ought to have the absolute right to deny a patient means of
being diagnosed, either. Under the principle of beneficence-the notion
that physicians ought to prevent harm57-for a caregiver to deny a patient a
means of diagnosis, where such a denial might cause the patient harm,
would be unequivocally unethical. However, patents allow for precisely this
denial. Since the enactment of the Physician Immunity Statute, patented
methods of diagnosis-except for biotechnology patents (i.e., gene tests)-
are exempt from patent enforcement. Thus, the Physician Immunity
Statute can be seen as supporting patient autonomy and physician
beneficence by removing potential legal barriers to diagnosis.
However, as discussed at greater length below, 5 8 the exemption for
biotechnology patents from the Physician Immunity Statute means that
gene patents can limit the ability of doctors to diagnose and research
genetic-based diseases. In Part II, 1 illustrate this danger by discussing the
Canavan patent; and in Part III, I argue for an amendment to the Physician
Immunity Statute that would limit the ability of patent holders to restrict
the use of processes used in the gene-based diagnosis of diseases. The
proposed amendment would extend support for the principles of patient
autonomy and patient beneficence to genetically-based diagnoses.
II. THE CANAVAN DISEASE PATENT
As the Council of Scientific Affairs of the American Medical
Association has recognized, the patent on the gene for Canavan disease
55. Tom L. BEACHAMP &JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 192 (4th
ed. 1994); see Thomas R. McCormick, Principles of Bioethics, Ethics in Medicine-Univ. of
Wash. Sch. of Med., at
http://eduserv.hscer.washington.edu/bioethics/tools/princpl.html#prinl (last visited May
17, 2004).
56. Id. at 121.
57. Id.
58. See infra Subsections II.B.3-4 (discussing the limitations on screening and research
caused by the Canavan gene patent).
IV:2 (2004)
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presents an excellent illustration of the problematic issues raised by the
patenting of gene-based diagnostic tests. 9 In its report announcing its
position on gene patenting, the Council notes that the Canavan patent
raises "serious issues of justice and fairness" and has resulted in the
undesirable restriction of access to needed diagnostic testing and
research. ° In this Part, I will take a closer look at the Canavan patent and
the issues it raises as an example of the ability of "inventors" to restrict
research and limit the availability of genetic testing using the patent
system.
A. The Discovery of the Canavan Disease Gene61
Jonathan Greenberg was born in 1981. Although he seemed normal at
birth, within a few months his parents became concerned about his
development; six months later, he was diagnosed with Canavan disease, an
inherited degenerative neurological disease. At the time, there were no
screening tests available for parents, nor were there any means of prenatal
diagnosis. The Greenbergs subsequently had another child, but their
daughter Amy also began to develop the symptoms and signs of the
• 62
disease.
In 1987,Jonathan's father, Daniel Greenberg, approached Dr. Reuben
Matalon, a physician then at the University of Illinois at Chicago, about
initiating research with the goal of identifying the Canavan disease gene
and ultimately developing a means to prevent or treat it. Daniel Greenberg
had previously founded the Chicago chapter of the National Tay-Sachs and
Allied Diseases Association (NTSAD); later, in conjunction with NTSAD,
he had established a Canavan Registry, which compiled information about
families who were carriers of the gene. Daniel Greenberg persuaded
Matalon to undertake the research, and together with other families
afflicted by Canavan disease, the Greenbergs supported Matalon's research
by supplying biological samples, including samples of Jonathan's brain
59. COUNCIL ON SC. AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N, REPORT No. 9, PATENTING GENES AND THEIR
MUTATIONS (Dec. 2000) [hereinafter COUNCIL ON SC. AFFAIRS], available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/article/2036-3603.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2004).
60. Id.
61. For background information on the Greenbergs and the efforts to find the gene
responsible for Canavan disease, see generally Compl., Greenberg v. Miami Children's
Hosp. Research Inst., 208 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (No. OOC-6779); Eliot Marshall,
Families Sue Hospital, Scientist for Control of Canavan Gene, 290 SCIENCE 1062 (2000).
62. See Compl. para. 4, Greenberg, 208 F. Supp. 2d 918.
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after he died in 1992; family pedigree information; and financial support. 3
Although Matalon had not previously engaged in Canavan research,
he successfully isolated the Canavan disease gene in 1993. 64 Identification
of the gene made widespread, rapid, and accurate screening, as well as
prenatal diagnosis,65 scientifically feasible-opening the door to the hope
of an eventual treatment or cure using gene therapy.
Canavan disease is caused by a defect or absence of an enzyme called
aspartoacylase. The disease is transmitted as an autosomal recessive trait
and is "characterized by spongy degeneration of the white matter of the
brain. ''67 It is more prevalent in Ashkenazi Jews than in the general
population, with the carrier rate among this demographic group as high as
1:36.6" The clinical manifestations vary, but the disease is uniformly fatal,
usually within the first decade of life. The preferred means to diagnose
Canavan disease is use of a biochemical assay that can detect the presence
of N-acetylaspartic acid, the substrate of the aspartoacylase, in the urine or
blood; carrier status can similarly be determined through the use of
cultured fibroblasts. 69
Matalon wrote the entry on Canavan disease in the current edition of
63. See id. para. 11, 17, 19.
64. U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635 (issued Oct. 21, 1997).
65. Previously, prenatal diagnosis was not possible because there is insufficient
aspartoacylase activity in chorionic villi and amniotic cells to render enzyme-based assays of
amniotic fluid or chorionic villus samples satisfactory. R. Matalon et al., Prenatal Diagnosis of
Canavan Disease, 15 J. INHERITED METABOLIC DISEASE 392 (1992). However, researchers
continue to make progress toward a genetic test for Canavan disease. See C. Janson et al.,
Clinical Protocol: Gene Therapy of Canavan Disease: AA V-2 Vector for Neurosurgical Delivery of
Aspartoacylase Gene (ASPA) to the Human Brain, 13 HUM. GENE THERAPY, 1391 (2002).
66. This means that it can skip generations and that if a child's mother and father are
both carriers of the gene, the child has a twenty-five percent chance of inheriting the
disorder.
67. Sankar Surendran et al., Molecular Basis of Canavan's Disease: From Human to Mouse,
18J. CHILD NEUROLOGY 604, 604 (2003).
68. Reuben K. Matalon, Aspartic Acid (Canavan Disease), in NELSON TEXTBOOK OF
PEDIATRICS (Richard E. Behrman et al. eds., 16th ed. 2000).
69. Fibroblasts are a connective tissue cell type that can easily be cultured from skin. Id.
It is not altogether clear why biochemical tests are still the preferred means of testing.
There are, however, at least two probable explanations: (1) Phenotypic expression (i.e.
diminished aspartoacylase activity) is the definition of the disease and, therefore, the "gold
standard" of determining whether one clinically suffers from Canavan disease; and 2)
Because of the possibility of novel spontaneous mutations, current genetic tests are most
likely not one hundred percent sensitive.
IV:2 (2004)
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the Nelson Textbook of Pediatrics, the most widely used general pediatrics
70textbook. Under the heading "Treatment and Prevention," Matalon
explained, "No specific treatment is available.... Genetic counseling,
carrier testing, and prenatal diagnosis are the only methods of
prevention."'" Even when a pediatric patient, as opposed to a fetus, is
diagnosed using the biochemical assay, Matalon writes that it is "important
to obtain a molecular diagnosis.' 72
_ Characterizing the patient's DNA
mutation makes possible the prenatal diagnosis of fetuses with that
mutation.
The discovery of the Canavan gene represented a rapid advance in
scientific knowledge and the potential (at least from a technological
perspective) to prevent a devastating disease. Had this discovery led to
widespread, easily accessible testing and research, it could have
immediately been considered a modern medical miracle. However, the
Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute (MCHRI), the hospital for
which Matalon worked when the gene was discovered and the patent
assignee, obtained a patent on the Canavan gene. Instead of maximizing
the possibility of preventing the disease by allowing the unlimited use of
Matalon's invention, MCHRI opted to maximize the licensing revenue it
could derive from the discovery. By threatening independent laboratories
and universities with infringement actions, MCHRI forced such centers to
refrain from offering testing, thus limiting research and the availability of
testing. Although the Canavan disease case, in which the parents of a child
afflicted with the disease sued MCHRI over the enforcement of the patent,
settled in 2003 on terms not available to the public, the facts of the case
illustrate the issues at question in the controversy over gene patents.
73
B. The Canavan Patent
On October 21, 1997, the U.S. PTO issued patent 5,679,635, entitled
"Aspartoacylase gene, protein, and methods of screening for mutations
associated with canavan [sic] disease" (the "Canavan patent") .7 The patent
specification discloses the cDNA75 sequence of the wild-type aspartoacylase
70. Id. at 376.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 375. Matalon explains that a proper diagnosis can lead to accurate counseling
and aid with future familial prenatal diagnosis.
73. Joint Press Release, Canavan Found. (Sept. 29, 2003),
http://www.canavanfoundation.org/news/09-03_miami.php.
74. U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635, supra note 42.
75. cDNA stands for "complementary DNA." cDNA is the DNA molecule that is
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gene, 76 along with the predominant mutations of the gene that cause
Canavan disease. Additionally, the patent teaches methods to screen
individuals for the presence of the gene. In exchange for this disclosure,
the patentees were granted claims not only on the gene and mutations that
they disclosed, but also on all human variants of the gene as they exist in
nature, whether or not yet discovered or disclosed in the application; any
fragment of the gene greater than or equal to 1.1% (sixteen base pairs) of
the disclosed sequence; 79 any methods to test for the presence or absence
of the gene, or any variant of the gene, in a patient;s and any probe which
might be useful in detecting or researching the disease.81 The patentees
were also granted claims on basic tools of research, including any and all
recombinant vectors, 82 host cells, 83 and methods of producing recombinant
protein 4_i e., tools absolutely necessary to develop a treatment or cure for
the disease.
1. DNA Sequence Claims
The claims of the Canavan patent are disproportionate to what the
specification discloses. The heart of the invention in the Canavan patent is
the sequence for the aspartoacylase gene, together with the discovery that
defective functioning of the gene product leads to the disease. The patent
discloses the wild-type sequence of the gene, as well as several mutations of
the gene that have been shown to be causative of Canavan disease.
85
complementary to the messenger RNA transcript of the genomic DNA (gDNA). Practically,
cDNA differs from gDNA in that the sequence of the cDNA has been edited by the cellular
machinery to remove any introns (i.e., DNA which does not encode proteins) or other
intervening sequences that exist in the genomic sequence. See G. Barsh et al., Genome
Structure and Gene Expression, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 60, 66, 68, 78.
76. A wild-type gene is "[t]he form of an organism that occurs most frequently in
nature." For this and other definitions, see Human Genome Information Project, Genome
Glossary, at http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/glossary/ (last visited
July 9, 2004).
77. "Teaches" is a term of art for the information which the patent discloses in its
specification.
78. U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635, supra note 64, claims 1-7, 12-13.
79. Id. claims Ic, 38.
80. Id. claims 25-37, 40-44.
81. Id. claims 8-11.
82. Id. claims 14-15.
83. Id. claims 16-17.
84. Id. claims 18-24, 39.
85. Id. at General Discussion.
IV:2 (2004)
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Specifically, using the pedigree data from seventeen non-related Jewish
families, the disclosure teaches that eighty-five percent of Canavan patients
of Ashkenazi Jewish descent share a point mutation-i.e., a change in a
single DNA base out of the 1435 bases that code for the aspartoacylase
protein.86 The causative mutation in another 14.8 percent of patients is
another point mutation that causes the premature arrest of the
transcription of the gene. 7 The patent additionally discloses various other
mutations.88
However, in addition to claiming the disclosed sequences-the wild-
type gene and specific mutations identified-the Canavan patent broadly
claims any and all forms of the gene and/or mutations thereof: Claim 1 of
the Canavan patent asserts the generic claim to a human aspartoacylase
gene, 89 and in claim 3, the patent goes on to explicitly claim any
aspartoacylase gene that "differs by at least one nucleotide from the
nucleotide sequence of [the wild-type gene], and is a naturally-occurring
allele of human aspartoacylase having an altered biological activity."90
Thus, the Canavan disease patent bars the characterization of a patient's
DNA regardless of whether or not the patient has the disease, and even if
the patient has a mutation that is not specifically disclosed in the Canavan
patent. This is the case because the patent discloses only the most common
disease-causing alleles, but claims "allelic variants" in addition to those
mutations disclosed. 9' In effect, the patent obtained is on the Canavan
locus. 92 In other words, the patentees have extended their disclosure of a
handful of mutations known to cause Canavan disease into claims on any
and all possible mutations, as well as any different aspartoacylase genes that
might exist in humans anywhere, regardless of their effect on the function
of the gene-or the fact that they have yet to be discovered. As the
specification asserts, "[i] t will be understood by those of skill in the art that
allelic or other sequence variations in the DNA... sequence[] of the
86. Id.
87. Id. at General Discussion, Example 12.
88. Id. at General Discussion.
89. The claim reads in full: "An isolated nucleic acid molecule comprising: (a) a nucleic
acid sequence encoding a human aspartoacylase polypeptide; (b) a nucleic acid sequence
fully complementary to nucleic acid sequence (a); or (c) a nucleic acid sequence at least 16
nucleotides in length capable of hybridizing specifically with one of said nucleic acid
molecules (a) or (b)." Id. claim 1.
90. Id. claim 3.
91. Id.
92. For further discussion of the basic difference between an allele and a locus, see Am.
Acad. of Pediatrics, supra note 2, at 1494.
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[aspartoacylase] gene.., are included in the present invention." 3
The breadth of this claim runs counter to the principle that for DNA
patents enough of the sequence must be disclosed to justify the breadth of
the claim sought. 4 MCHRI's attempt to broadly claim all aspartoacylase
sequences is reminiscent of Amgen v. Chugai, where a patent was found
invalid because the biotechnology firm Amgen claimed all possible
sequences coding for the gene for erythropoietin, but only disclosed the
wild-type sequence and a few analogs. 95 However, although MCHRI's patent
may be overbroad, the validity of the patent has not been challenged
directly. The full breadth of the patent, as issued, would cover any genetic
mutation causing Canavan disease, whether or not discovered by Dr.
Matalon or other researchers at MCHRI.
2. Methods for Screening for Canavan Mutations
The Canavan patent employs two overlapping strategies for obtaining
coverage of all means of diagnosing the presence of the Canavan disease
gene: Claims 25-37 are "method" or "process" claims, 96 and claims 8-11
cover the DNA molecule probes that are essential to amplifying a patient's
DNA in order to utilize those methods or processes.97 Claim 25 broadly
claims a generic method for screening a person for the gene:
A method of screening a subject to determine if said subject is a Canavan
carrier or a Canavan patient, comprising (a) providing a biological
sample of the subject to be screened; and (b) submitting the sample to
an assay for detecting in the biological sample the presence of a wild-type
aspartoacylase gene, a mutant aspartoacylase gene or a mixture thereof,
wherein said gene has a DNA sequence of claim 1, and wherein detection
of a mutant as [sic] aspartoacylase gene indicates that the subject is a
Canavan carrier or a Canavan patient. 98
The patent goes on to specifically claim different methods well known
in the art which could be used to test for the presence of the mutant gene,
whether by hybridization assay,99 labeled nucleotide probes,'00 DNA
93. U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635, supra note 64, at General Discussion.
94. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 856 (1991).
95. Id. at 1214.
96. U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635, supra note 64, claims 25-37.
97. Id. claims 8-11.
98. Id. claim 25.
99. Id. claim 26. Hydridization assays, whether using radionucleotide probes (i.e.,
IV:2 (2004)
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hybridization assay, t°  RFLP,102 heteroduplex analysis, °3 or kits for
performing these procedures. 4 The result of these expansive claims is that
any attempt to test a person's genetic material for the mutant gene using
conventional molecular genetic tools found in any molecular biology
laboratory will infringe on the Canavan patent.
3. Decreased Availability of Screening
In testimony before Congress, the College of American Pathologists
complained of the deleterious effect of patent enforcement on the
availability of diagnostic tests generally, stating that forty-eight percent of
seventy-four university-based clinical laboratories surveyed had ceased
performing or developing a test for either clinical or research purposes
because of patent restnctions. That patent enforcement leads to
diminished availability for genetic testing has also been shown for another
genetic disorder, hereditary haemochromatosis. 
06
In light of these facts, it is not surprising that the enforcement of the
Canavan patent also led to diminished availability of testing. Citing
negotiations with "major pharmaceutical companies" seeking licensing to
offer Canavan tests, MCHRI in November of 1998 began to assert its patent
radioactively labeled DNA) or other DNA sequence fragments, rely on the double-stranded
nature of DNA. They work because single strands of DNA will automatically bind
complementary sequences. Thus, labeled DNA fragments can be used to bind larger DNA
fragments (i.e., those isolated from a patient). Human Genome Information Project, supra
note 76.
100. U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635, supra note 64, claim 27.
101. Id. claim 30.
102. Id. claim 31. Restriction fragment length polymorphisms (RFLPs) rely on bacterial
enzymes that cut DNA strands at known sequences. When a mutation changes the
sequence, the bacterial enzyme no longer can cleave the DNA. Human Genome
Information Project, supra note 76.
103. U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635, supra note 64, claim 32.
104. Id. claims 33-37, 42, 44.
105. Gene Patents and Other Genomic Inventions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Courts and
Intellectual Property of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 106' Cong. 158-60 (2000) (prepared
statement of the Coll. of Am. Pathologists).
106. Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test, 415 NATURE 577, 577 (2002). Merz
and his colleagues conducted a survey of clinical labs and examined whether the existence
of patents on the gene causing haemochromatosis, a blood disorder causing excessive red
blood cell production, affected the offering of genetic tests for the disease. They concluded
that enforcement of hemochromatosis gene patents caused laboratories to cease offering
testing for the gene. Id. at 578-79.
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rights by sending cease-and-desist letters to centers offering testing without
a license; the letters advised the centers of MCHRI's intention to "enforce
vigorously our intellectual property rights relating to carrier, pregnancy,
and patient DNA tests for Canavan Disease mutations. ' ' As a result,
community organizations and academic centers previously offering testing
were forced to stop doing so or risk liability for patent infringement.
Referring specifically to the availability of Canavan disease testing, the
AMA concluded in December 2000 that "[t] he ultimate impact [of patent
enforcement] is that the test is currently not available to many of those who
desire it.
°108
Because prior art biochemical assays remain the preferred means of
diagnosing Canavan disease in patients once they are born, the most
significant effect of the Canavan patent is on prenatal testing, which
cannot be done using the prior art methods.'O° Thus, the restriction of
testing due to exclusive licensing is most acutely felt where it is currently
needed most-in disease prevention.
4. Canavan Patent Restricts Research
While the lack of availability of genetic testing is an undeniably
important problem for families who may be carriers of these diseases,
another concern raised by the award of gene patents is their potentially
chilling effect on innovative attempts to treat or cure genetic disease.""
Because Canavan disease is caused by an inborn error of metabolism, gene
therapy provides the only hope for developing treatment or a cure.
Unfortunately, MCHRI was granted claims on the very basic tools of
molecular research-the vectors,"' host cells,"2 and recombinant genes"'
107. See Compl. para. 32, Ex. A, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 208
F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Il1. 2002) (No. 00C-6779).
108. COUNCIL ON SCI. AFFAIRS, supra note 59. For information about the current
availability of Canavan disease testing, see Screening & Testing Centers, Canavan Foundation,
at http://www.canavanfoundation.org/screening.php (last visited May 17, 2004).
Availability remains limited, id., nearly one year after the Greenberg case was settled, infra
text accompanying note 118.
109. See supra note 65.
110. It is difficult to determine definitively the inhibitory effect of the Canavan patent on
research as there is no way to know what projects might have been undertaken were it not
for the patent. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, researchers may now use the
Canavan disease gene without fear of litigation.
111. U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635, supra note 64, claims 14-15.
112. Id. claims 16-17.
IV:2 (2004)
18
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 4 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol4/iss2/2
GENE DIAGNOSIS AND "THE PHYSICIAN IMMUNITY STATUTE"
absolutely essential to researching a treatment or cure. The patent uses this
combination of claims to cover the basic methodologies of genetic
research, making it impossible for a worker skilled in the art to research
Canavan disease without infringing on the patent. Unlike many other
industrialized nations,14 the United States's recognition of an
"experimental use" exception to patent infringement is extremely
narrow."5 Researchers hoping to cure Canavan disease through gene
therapy would not be protected from a patent infringement suit, since
such research could be viewed as a "commercialization" of the Canavan
patent.1
6
In the case of Canavan disease, the families who motivated the
Canavan disease research and supplied the biological materials"' that were
necessary for the discovery of the gene filed a complaint alleging breach of
fiduciary duty, lack of informed consent, and unjust enrichment. Although
there was no remedy for them under U.S. patent law, the families and
MCHRI reached a settlement on August 6, 2003, ensuring the free use of
the Canavan gene in research to cure the disease. MCHRI will, however,
continue to collect royalties on the screening test."" It is important to
113. Id. claims 18-24.
114. For a comparative review of nations' experimental use exception to patents, see
Natalie M. Dzerko, A Local and Comparative Analysis of the Experimental Use Exception-Is
Harmonization Appropriate?, 44 IDEA 1, 28-70 (2003).
115. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that "the
experimental use defense is very narrow and strictly limited").
116. For a review of the experimental use doctrine under U.S. law, see
Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair" Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent
Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REv. 1, 17-32 (2001). Mueller writes:
An experimental use exception has met with little success in the United
States .... The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has grudgingly
recognized the existence of a common law experimental use defense, but
characterizes it as 'truly narrow' and applicable only to trifling 'dilettante affairs.'
Banished from the experimental use defense is any activity viewed as
'commercialization' or otherwise grounded on profit motive. The current narrow
interpretation of the doctrine virtually assures that it cannot be relied on by the
rapidly growing number of university and industry collaborations whose research
and development efforts are ultimately targeted at the commercialization of new
biomedical products.
Id. at 5 (internal citations omitted).
117. See Compl., Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 208 F. Supp. 2d
918 (N.D. 111. 2002) (No. OOC-6779).
118. Press Release, Canavan Found., Gene Patent Lawsuit May Radically Affect Research
(Sept. 29, 2003), available at http://www.canavanfoundation.org/news/09-03-miami.php
(last visited Apr. 14, 2004).
19
Lekovic: Genetic Diagnosis and Intellectual Property Rights
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
recognize that this settlement was made possible, in large part, by the
particular facts of the Canavan gene discovery, which was funded initially
by Canavan families, who then challenged the ownership of the patent on
grounds outside the arena of ordinary patent law. Because of the
complaint brought by the Greenberg family, all patients suffering from
Canavan disease, as well as their families, enjoy the hope that they might
benefit from the free use of the gene for research toward a cure.
Unfortunately, these facts would apply to few, if any, patients suffering
from other genetic diseases; these patients, therefore, will not have the
same opportunity to ensure access to research.
Importantly, the effects on scientific research may be more insidious
than simply the ability of the patentee to deny a competitor the right to do
research. The AMA Council on Scientific Affairs warns of the corrupting
influence that licensing agreements, which are beyond the purview of the
Patent Office, may have on clinical research. The Council has noted that
nothing would prevent a patentee from restricting a license such that the
licensee would be "'gagged' regarding findings that question the validity
and quality of data."119
Whether continued enforcement of the Canavan gene patent would
have resulted in less research, less critical examination of the research that
did occur, less prenatal screening, or all of the above, the future for
potential victims of Canavan disease would have been similarly bleak:
Under any of these scenarios, the enforcement of the Canavan patent
undoubtedly would result in more children being born with this
devastating neurological condition than would be the case if diagnostic
testing were freely and widely available. Although the specter of
intellectual property rights impeding the discovery of treatments and cures
is today counterfactual in the Canavan case, this troubling prospect, along
with the more immediately palpable problem of decreased access to
screening technologies, is of general concern in the era of gene patents.
III. AMENDING THE "PHYSICIAN IMMUNITY STATUTE"
At its 2000 interim meeting, the American Medical Association (AMA)
House of Delegates adopted a resolution declaring that the AMA "supports
equitable access to licenses or sublicenses of gene patents for diagnostic
genetic tests to any Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA)- certified
laboratory at a reasonable royalty."'1 20 Unfortunately, given the practice of
119. COUNCIL ON Sci. AFFAIRS, supra note 59.
120. COUNCIL ON Sci. AFFAIRS, AMA, REPORT No. 5, GENE PATENTING: UTILITY
IV:2 (2004)
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patentees negotiating exclusive licensing agreements, 2 1 the lack of controls
to ensure widespread licensing,1 22 and the legal difficulties that would be
incurred by attempts to institute controls such as mandatory licensing,
123
the AMA's proposal for widespread access to diagnostic tests for a
"reasonable royalty" is inadequate to remedy the problems posed by
patents for gene-based diagnostic tests. The Canavan patent does not exist
in a vacuum, nor is its enforcement just a case of moral bankruptcy on the
part of one particular hospital. Rather it is a systemic problem that requires
an adjustment to the law to cure.
Specifically, the Physician Immunity Statute 24 should be amended so
that the exemption for "medical activit[ies]" includes the identification of
a patient's genes for purposes of diagnosis or prenatal screening. Such an
amendment would define the limits of a patent holder's right to exclude,
thereby allowing patients' greater access to the diagnostic tests that play
such an important role in the diagnosis and prevention of genetic-based
diseases. This proposal brings the scope of patent protection for genetic
testing into accord with that of other diagnostic procedures already
encompassed by the Physician Immunity Statute.
A. Amending the Statute
As I argued earlier, the legislative history of the Physician Immunity
Statute shows that the exclusion of "biotechnology patent[s]" from the
Act's protections was the result of aggressive lobbying on the part of the
biotechnology lobby, 125 and the exclusion is broadly defined: A
EXAMINATION GUIDELINES (2001), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/print/203 6 -
4968.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2004).
121. For an overview of the considerations that enter into patent licensing, see Paul E.
Schaafsma, An Economic Review and Suggested Approach for Licensing Patent Applications, 81 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 340 (1999).
122. For an illustration of how exclusive licensing can have adverse effects, see Peter
Mikhail, Hopkins v. CellPro: An Illustration That Patenting and Exclusive Licensing of
Fundamental Science Is Not Always in the Public Interest, 13 HARv.J.L. & TECH. 375 (2000).
123. See generallyJanice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industhy Standards,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 664-69 (2002) (discussing the use of mandatory licensing as a
sanction for failing to disclose patent rights). Although Mueller argues for compulsory
licenses of patented technology that becomes an "industry standard," id. at 664, this article
provides an overview of the historical objections to mandatory licensing schemes.
124. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 616, 110
Stat. 3009, 3009-67 (1996) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000)).
125. See Portman, supra note 40. A use or utility patent is a patent obtained on an
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"biotechnology patent" includes a "biotechnology process," as defined in
35 U.S.C. §103(b), as well as a patent on a process of making or using
biological materials.
Thus, included under this exemption are claims, like those in the
Canavan patent, premised on standard molecular techniques, such as
restriction fragment length polymerase (RFLP) testing, used in the gene-
based diagnosis of diseases. This result reflects the success of the
biotechnology lobby's aggressive efforts. 26 In order to roll back this
exemption and ensure greater access to genetic diagnostic tests, I propose
the following amendment to 287 (c) (2):
Recognizing that the human genome is the common heritage of all
humanity, and that genetic diagnostic testing is playing an increasingly
important role in the prevention of disease, Section 287(c) of Title 35,
United States Code, is amended by replacing § 287(c) (2) (A) (iii) with the
following revised subsection: "(iii) the practice of a process in violation of
a biotechnology patent, other thanforpurposes of diagnosis."
In March 2002, Representative Lynn Rivers sponsored legislation
similar to that proposed here. The "Genomic Research and Diagnosis
Accessibility Act of 2002" included provisions allowing gene sequences to
be used for research and diagnosis, and it required the disclosure of DNA
sequences at the time an individual applied for a patent.1 27 Unfortunately,
invented composition of matter (as opposed to a design patent, which is a patent on an
ornamental design or appearance, or a plant patent, which is a patent on a novel plant). See
BARRETT, supra note 17, at 111-371.
126. However, even the biotechnology industry is not without internal dissent. In
testimony before the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, Barbara
Caulfield, general counsel for the biotechnology company Affymetrix stated that "there
should be no patenting of gene sequences, period." See Tom Abate, Do Gene Patents Wrap
Research in Red Tape?, S.F. CHRON., March 25, 2002, at El.
127. Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th Cong.
(2002), was introduced in the House of Representatives in March of 2002. Section 3 of the
bill provided that "the term 'medical activity' means the performance of a genetic
diagnostic, prognostic, or predictive test or a medical or surgical procedure.'" It further
defined those terms as follows:
[T] he term "genetic diagnostic, prognostic, or predictive test" means any test,
designed to detect disease, to predict the potential for a medical disorder, or to
predict the effectiveness of therapeutics, which uses either an ordered listing of
nucleotides comprising a portion of a human or human pathogen genetic code
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the legislation died when Representative Rivers lost her Congressional seat
to fellow incumbent Representative John Dingell following redistricting.
Nevertheless, there is an increasing awareness of the continued need for a
legislative remedy for the growing conflict between patent jurisprudence
and the needs of medical researchers and patients.2
8
The simpler proposal offered here more narrowly addresses the
specific issue of ensuring physician immunity from patent infringement in
the diagnosis of genetic disorders. Such a remedy allows patients at risk of
genetic disorders to have unfettered access to diagnostic testing, without
being encumbered by the broader issues of the effect of gene patents on
research and industry disclosure raised by Representative Rivers's proposal.
Although the effect of gene patents on research remains a significant
concern, I have deliberately chosen to adopt a more modest approach in
my proposal. Indeed, a broader approach, such as the one attempted by
Representative Rivers, would be more likely to mobilize the biotechnology
lobby and impede the likelihood of the amendment's success.
Moreover, extending the protection from infringement to academic or
industrial researchers (or others not engaged directly in patient care) is
unnecessary to redress the problem of the negative effect of patents on
genetic testing. Rather, the potential for commercial gain from
applications other than testing, such as would be obtained though
commercial research, would be all the more critical after passage of this
proposed amendment eliminating such gains from diagnostic applications.
Experience in the pharmaceutical and medical device industries is
persuasive that patent protection or, more specifically, the economic
incentives associated with such protection are critical to the development
of novel therapies. 12 9 Therefore it is the express intention of this proposal
128. See John Barton, Patents, Genomics, Research and Diagnostics, 77 ACAD. MED. 1339
(2002). Professor Barton advocates for a narrow legislative exemption aimed at protecting
medical research from patents on ESTs and SNPs, as well as legislative and/or judicial
challenges to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's recent extensions of patentable
subject matter.
129. It is widely believed that the pharmaceutical industry would not engage in the costly
research and development process required for new therapies, if not for the monopoly
rights guaranteed by patent protection. While other public policies-including tax
incentives and grants of public monies-may also encourage technical innovation, patents
continue to be viewed as the essential element. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV'T,
PATENTS AND INNOVATION: TRENDS AND POLICY CHALLENGES 9 (2004),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/12/2 4 50 8 5 4 1.pdf; Wesley M. Cohen, Patents: Their
Effectiveness and Role, Presentation to the FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition and
Intellectual Property Law in the Knowledge-Based Economy (Feb. 20, 2002),
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to maintain the traditional patent incentives in such cases. However,
whereas biotechnology patents may well be necessary to ensure the
commercial viability of the development of gene therapies (in analogy to
pharmaceuticals), molecular diagnostics are more easily developed,' 30 and
genetic diagnosis is easily performed once a gene has been sequenced.3 1
By limiting the biotechnology patent exemption of § 287(c), the
restrictions on diagnostic testing, as in the case of Canavan disease, would
be loosened to the benefit of patients. The precise extent of this loosening
would have to be worked out in the political process. For example, a
Congressional majority might want to impose stricter restrictions on
parents' access to fetal genetic information than it would on individuals'
access to their own "personal" genetic information. Even if the legislative
process, subject to judicial review, were to maintain relatively tight
restrictions on access to genetic testing, it is better that those restrictions
be controlled by the policy choices of publicly accountable representatives,
rather than the individual actions of private parties.
This modification would result in more widely available tests and,
consequently, increased prevention of genetic disease. In addition, the
proposal would alleviate concerns about the potential gagging effect of
licenses, since physicians would be free to perform the diagnostic tests and
report their efficacy in journals without the fear of data being subjected to
oversight by the licensing company. The potential for licenses to gag
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/cohen.pdf. There is considerable debate about how to
most efficiently achieve costly drug innovation and whether current patent terms are ideal.
See, e.g., OXFAM, IMPLAUSIBLE DENIAL: WHY THE DRUG GIANTS' ARGUMENTS ON PATENTS DON'T
STAKE UP (2001), at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/issues/health/implausibledenial.htm (last visited
May 17, 2004); see also Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 11. However, there is little question
that the costs of developing diagnostics are less than for developing therapeutics, see infra
note 130 and accompanying text; one can hypothesize that the incentives required are also
reduced.
130. The timeline for scientific development and regulatory approval of diagnostics is
shorter than for therapeutics and the process, overall, is less expensive. However, the
revenue potential is smaller for diagnostics than for therapeutics for several reasons,
including greater price sensitivity. See, e.g., Robert S. Schifreen, Molecular Diagnostics: The
Challenge for the Future, IWD TECH., Nov. 2003, at 27.
131. For example, one study found that many laboratories offered testing for genes
based on published sequence data, before any commercial kits were made available (and
not coincidentally before the patents were enforced). Mildred K. Cho, Effects of Patents and
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physicians is based on a contractual relationship between the physician and
the patent holder; thus, in the absence of such an agreement, a physician
would be able to publish based on his or her own clinical experience with
the test. This would in turn benefit patients, since the doctor-physician
relationship requires that patients be able to trust their physicians, and is
undermined by third party influences on physician decision making.
B. Policy Cost-Benefit Analysis
The biotechnology lobby, in its attack on the original incarnation of
the Physician Immunity Statute, argued that gene patents protect
companies' investments and therefore have a net effect of increasing
research and development, resulting in more diagnostic tests, drugs, and
novel therapies. 13 2 While it is likely that patent protection, generally
speaking, does stimulate research and development, several coinciding
factors dilute the value of the patent "incentive" not just for gene patents
on methods of diagnosis, but for gene patents in general. In the early days
of biotechnology, the effort required to clone a gene or elucidate its
sequence was staggering. 133 Courts were cajoled into recognizing the
substantial amount of labor that scientists put into these "inventions" in
order to provide the nascent biotechnology industry with an incentive to
continue such tedious work. However, they could not have anticipated that
what in the 1980s required Herculean labor would, by the mid-1990s, easily
be achieved in a day. The increase in the speed and ease of sequencing has
meant that the "innovation" required to patent a gene is not now what it
was when Dr. Chakrabarty successfully defended his groundbreaking
patent on a genetically-modified oyster before the Supreme Court. 3 4 With
each passing day, as technology becomes more advanced, it requires less
and less "innovation" to patent a gene.
132. Hearings on HR. 1127, supra note 45, at 92, 94-98 (prepared testimony of Frank
Baldino,Jr., President and CEO of Cephalon, Inc.).
133. At its inception around 1990, it was estimated that the Human Genome Project
would take 30,000 person-years to complete, based on the then maximum rate of
sequencing of 100,000 base pairs per person per year. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, supra note
1, at 291. With the advent of automated high-output sequencing, analysis of the human
genome can proceed at a much faster pace now than it could just a few years ago. See Mark
Adams et al., Complementary DNA Sequencing: Expressed Sequence Tags and Human Genome
Project, 252 SCIENCE 1651, 1651 (1991). Perhaps even more important is the diminution in
the costs of sequencing that comes with automation. Id. at 1651.
134. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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A second consideration is the "gold rush" aspect of gene patenting. 135
The human genome is finite-more so than was at first appreciated 36 -
and researchers have already completed sequencing the human genome.131
University scientists "and at least one major pharmaceutical company" have
reacted to the attempt by genome companies to appropriate the human
genome by dedicating sequence data to the public, creating prior art
hurdles for many gene patents.3 8 Between the sequences dedicated to the
public, and those already "invented," the window for inventors to "invent"
human genes is closing. In fact, before the PTO imposed the utility
requirements on EST patent claims, many companies had been filing for
patent applications on DNA molecules for which no function is known,
simply speculating on the possibility that their patented sequence will turn
out to be an important one. At least in the initial stage of the genetic
revolution, a "gold rush" mentality dominated. Despite the PTO's
heightened emphasis on the utility criterion, individuals and enterprises
who were attracted to this "patent bonanza" atmosphere might continue to
file for intellectual property protection not to further knowledge, but
rather to stake a claim to a patch of DNA that the "inventor" hopes will one
day yield a mother lode.
Moreover, while the relatively small number of genes being dedicated
to the public increases, the number of overlapping, or stacked, patents on
genes is likely to increase. Since many "stacked" patents on the same
disease gene will increase the licensing costs of the diagnostic test, it is
possible, if not likely, that gene- based diagnostic tests will be kept out of
the market not by scientific obstacles, but rather by commercial ones.
13 9
The liberal issuance of "Expressed Sequence Tag" (EST) patents 40
135. Susan Watts, The Genetic Goldrush, INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 27, 1994, at 21.
136. It contains approximately 30,000 loci. International Human Genome Sequencing
Consortium, 409 NATURE 860, 861 (2001).
137. Elizabeth Pennisi, Reaching Their Goal Early, Sequencing Labs Celebrate, 300 SCIENCE
409 (2003).
138. See Eliot Marshall, Companies Rush to Patent DNA, 275 SCIENCE 780, 781 (1997);
Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 559, 561.
139. This is what Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg have referred to as the "tragedy
of the anticommons ... in biomedical research." Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 701.
"A proliferation of intellectual property rights upstream may be stifling life-saving
innovations further downstream." Id. at 698.
140. An EST is a cDNA corresponding to randomly selected messenger RNA isolated
from a cell. Because messenger RNA is the transcript of genomic DNA on its way to being
"expressed" as protein, the sequences are limited to expressed sequences. It is further
called a 'tag' because the procedure generated only a fragment of the cDNA transcript.
IV:2 (2004)
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threatened to inordinately dilute the value of a patent on a gene for
purposes of diagnosis because ESTs are by definition non-functional
fragments of a gene; their main potential commercial utility is to aid in
diagnosis.14' Although patents for bare genetic sequences can no longer be
used to claim the underlying gene and protein if their functions are
unknown,'42 there remains the problem of overlapping or stacked patents
due to polymorphisms or mutations of the same gene. There are literally
hundred of mutations of the breast cancer gene, each one potentially
patentable. 4 3 Theoretically, even a handful of disease-causing alleles could
each be subject to several patents, so that the number of cross-licenses
needed to market a diagnostic test would be unworkable.
14 4
Moreover, in addition to these trends, it is too simplistic to argue that
private capital provided by biotechnology investors, enticed by the
prospect of licensing fees, is absolutely necessary for the discovery of genes
and the development of diagnostic tests. The Medical Procedure Patent
Coalition argues that the patent "incentive" is unnecessary in medical
practice, as "the development of new medical procedures often occurs
during the normal course of medical practice and generally does not
require significant capital investment.' 45 Even if genetic tests are not
Human Genome Information Project, supra note 76.
141. See, e.g., AM. SOC'Y OF HuMAN GENETICS, PATENTING OF EXPRESSED SEQUENCE TAGS
(1991), http://genetics.faseb.org/genetics/ashg/policy/pol-08.htm (recognizing the
potential commercial application in the realm of diagnostics but noting that "the utility of
ESTs can be seriously questioned. Scientific experience suggests that an EST itself is
unlikely to have commercial utility. The [principal] anticipated utility of an EST is simply as
a research tool to identify the remainder of the coding region of the gene.").
142. "If a patent discloses only nucleic acid structure for a newly discovered gene, and no
utility for the claimed isolated gene, the claimed invention is not patentable. . . .ESTS
which meet the criteria for utility, novelty, and nonobviousness are eligible for patenting
when the application teaches those of skill in the art how to make and use the invention."
Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 33, at 1093-94 (Jan. 5, 2001); see also Tom
Hollon, Gene Patent Revisions To Remove Some Controversies, 6 NATURE MED. 362, 362 (April
2000).
143. There are approximately460 known, distinct sequence variants of BRCAI (one of
two known breast and ovarian cancer genes). Therese Sorlie et al., Mutation Screening of
BRCA1 Using PTY and LOH Analysis at I 7q2 1 in Breast Carcinomas from Familial and Non-
familial Cases, 48 BREAST CANCER RES. TREAT. 259, 259 (1998).
144. Cf Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 699 (discussing the analogous problem of
concurrent fragments" in pharmaceutical screening).
145. Jenner & Block, Patents for Surgical/ Medical Procedures: A Callfor Legislative Prohibition,
http://www.ascrs.org/advocacy/execsum.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2004).
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generally developed "during the normal course of medical practice," these
tests may well require less investment of time, money, and talent to develop
than other inventions, such as pharmaceuticals. Moreover, as with other
medical procedures, researchers may be draw substantial motivation from
non-monetary incentives, such as a desire to improve their professional
stature or reputation. In addition, in the case of many rare diseases, it is
patients, patient support groups, and their doctors who raise money and
awareness of the disease seeking a treatment, diagnostic test, or cure.
Canavan disease is a formidable example of research driven by patients,
not industry. Exempting physicians from patent infringement would have
had little, if any, effect on Matalon's discovery of the gene, although it
might have spared "Canavan families" the burden of pursuing their lawsuit.
The societal benefit of these private research dollars is further reduced
by a corresponding increase in costs associated with gene patenting, which
effectively retards research. These costs range from the systemic effects of
gene patenting that create commercial incentives that skew academic
research 146 away from free disclosure of information to the diminution in
research caused by inhibiting basic academic research secondary to
increased research costs. 47 The Canavan patent, for example, covers any
and all uses of the gene or even fragments of the gene, making research on
the Canavan disease gene without a license impossible. In addition, the
specter of stacked patents on ESTs may exacerbate these negative
tendencies exponentially. Imagine the same facts surrounding the
Canavan patent, but where the testing centers were issued cease-and-desist
letters from a dozen different genome corporations with claims to parts of
the Canavan sequence, or prominent mutations. Given these negative
factors, it is not at all clear that the net effect on innovation attributable to
gene patents is positive.
There are other costs associated with patents on genetic diagnostic
tests. In fact, there are human costs. There can be no question that the
enforcement of the Canavan patent claims on diagnostic tests results in
more children being born with this preventable genetic disease which
causes incredible suffering and hardship on families and which is
ultimately uniformly lethal.
Finally, the patent right may be subject to abuse. The fundamental
right a patent provides is the right to exclude others from making or using
the disclosed invention. Thus, for example, a religious group that fears
146. David Blumenthal, Academic-Industrial Relationships in the Life Sciences, 349 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 2452, 2455 (2003); see also Blumenthal, supra note 31.
147. See generally Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 700.
IV:2 (2004)
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that diagnostic tests will result in more prenatal diagnosis and abortion
could purchase patents on childhood diseases to prevent the development
of such tests. Alternatively, a company could patent a gene, but then not
have the financial resources to exploit its invention and allow the patent to
languish.'
4
While patent protection currently leads to monopoly control over a
gene, conversely, stacked patents, which each necessitate cross-licensing,
potentially dilute the value of any individual patent. The amendment to
the Physician Immunity Statute which I propose would obviate entirely the
issue of whether one is infringing on one exclusive licensee or two
hundred potential licensees by allowing unfettered access to genetic
diagnosis. Similarly, should a patent-holder not have the means to develop
or market kits to make diagnosis practically feasible, independent labs
would be free to do so. Finally, the provision would prevent the patent
system from being used as a vehicle for restricting licenses out of non-
economic concerns, such as to prevent pre-implantation diagnosis or
family planning.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that society benefits from medical advances in its
ability to diagnose and treat human ailments in which genetic
predisposition is a causal or contributing factor. Society can also benefit
from the patenting of genes that can be exploited to develop novel
medicines such as Epogen, Amgen's recombinant erythropoietin product,
or incorporated into gene therapies. These are examples of beneficent
applications of gene patents; so, too, are patents for pharmaceuticals that
encourage innovation and research into new drug treatments. The
proposed legislation would have no effect on the biotechnology industry's
ability to continue to bring such ground-breaking and important
inventions to market. For example, gene therapy-attempts to correct the
genetic defect through the use of recombinant technology-would not be
affected by the proposed legislation. As far as diagnostics are concerned,
though, patent protection is not in the public interest. This Article
proposes a narrowly tailored approach that would alleviate the problems
caused by patents such as the Canavan patent without affecting the ability
148. For an overview of the history of suppressed patents (where a company withholds
development of a patent for strategic reasons), as well as for a proposal for compulsory
licensing of non-used patents, see Kurt Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest
as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARv.J.L. & TECH. 389 (2002).
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of-or incentives for- biotechnology or pharmaceutical companies to
develop novel, and patentable, drugs or other therapies.
30
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 4 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol4/iss2/2
